Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. While perfect information theoretic security is impossible, quantum oblivious transfer protocols can limit the dishonest players' cheating. Finding the optimal security parameters in such protocols is an important open question. In this paper we show that every 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol allows a dishonest party to cheat with probability bounded below by a constant strictly larger than 1/2. Alice's cheating is defined as her probability of guessing Bob's index, and Bob's cheating is defined as his probability of guessing both input bits of Alice. In our proof, we relate these cheating probabilities to the cheating probabilities of a coin flipping protocol and conclude by using Kitaev's coin flipping lower bound. Then, we present an oblivious transfer protocol with two messages and cheating probabilities at most 3/4. Last, we extend Kitaev's semidefinite programming formulation to more general primitives, where the security is against a dishonest player trying to force the outcome of the other player, and prove optimal lower and upper bounds for them.
Introduction
Quantum information enables us to do cryptography with information theoretic security. The first breakthrough result in quantum cryptography is the unconditionally secure key distribution protocol of Bennett and Brassard [BB84] . Since then, a long series of work has studied which other cryptographic primitives are possible in the quantum world. However, the subsequent results were negative. Mayers and Lo, Chau proved the impossibility of secure ideal quantum bit commitment and oblivious transfer and consequently of any type of two-party secure computation [May97, LC97, DKSW07] . On the other hand, several imperfect variants of these primitives have been shown to be possible. Finding the optimal parameters for such fundamental primitives has been since an important open question. The reason for looking at these abstract primitives is that they are the basis for all cryptographic protocols one may wish to construct, including identification schemes, digital signatures, electronic voting, etc. Let us emphasize that in this paper we only look at information theoretic security and we do not discuss computational security or security in restricted models like the bounded-storage or noisy-storage model.
We start with coin flipping, which was first proposed by Blum [Blu81] and has since found numerous applications in two-party secure computation. Even though the results of Mayers and of Lo and Chau exclude the possibility of perfect quantum coin flipping, i.e., where the resulting coin is perfectly unbiased, it still remained open whether one can construct a quantum protocol where no player could bias the coin with probability 1. Aharonov et al. [ATVY00] provided such a protocol where no dishonest player could bias the coin with probability higher than 0.9143. Then, Ambainis [Amb01] described an improved protocol whose cheating probability was at most 3/4. Subsequently, a number of different protocols had been proposed [SR01, NS03, KN04] that achieved the same bound of 3/4.
On the other hand, Kitaev [Kit03] , using a formulation of quantum coin flipping as semidefinite programs proved a lower bound of 1/2 on the product of the cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob (see [ABDR04] ). In other words, no quantum coin flipping protocol can achieve a cheating probability less than 1/ √ 2 for both Alice and Bob. The question of whether 3/4 or 1/ √ 2 was the right answer has recently been resolved by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] who described a protocol with cheating probability arbitrarily close to 1/ √ 2. In their protocol they use as a subroutine a weaker variant of coin flipping which is referred to as weak coin flipping.
Weak coin flipping protocols with cheating probabilities less than 3/4 were first constructed in [SR02, Amb02, KN04] . The best bound was in fact 1/ √ 2 until the breakthrough result by Mochon who described a protocol with cheating probability 2/3 [Moc05] and then a protocol that achieves a cheating probability of 1/2 + ǫ for any ǫ > 0 [Moc07] . Hence the optimal biases for weak and strong coin flipping are now known.
The question is still unresolved for quantum bit commitment. On one hand, a bit commitment protocol implies a coin flipping protocol with the same parameters. In fact, most of the known strong coin flipping protocols are of this form: Alice first quantumly commits to a bit a. Then, Bob announces a bit b. Last, Alice reveals bit a and the result of the coin flip is c = a ⊕ b. Hence, Kitaev's lower bound states that no quantum bit commitment protocol can achieve cheating probabilities lower than 1/ √ 2. On the other hand, the best protocols we know achieve a value of 3/4. In fact, the only strong coin flipping protocol that achieves a value better than 3/4 is the optimal protocol of ChaillouxKerenidis, which is not based on a quantum bit commitment scheme, but on Mochon's weak coin flipping protocol. Hence, the question of the optimal bias for quantum bit commitment remains open.
In this paper, we focus on oblivious transfer, which is a universal primitive for any twoparty secure computation [Rab81, EGL82, Cré87] . We define a 1-out-of-2 random oblivious transfer protocol with bias ε, denoted here as random-OT , to be a protocol where:
• Alice outputs two uniformly random bits (x 0 , x 1 )
• Bob outputs x b for a uniformly random choice of b • The bias of the protocol is defined as ǫ := max{ǫ A , ǫ B } where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Alice and Bob respectively. Note that in our definition, the bias is not defined just as an upper bound on the cheating probabilities but corresponds to the optimal cheating probability.
We note here that an honest Bob can learn both bits with probability 1/2, since he can learn one bit prefectly and can make a random guess for the other bit.
There is also another variant, denoted as OT , where Alice and Bob have specific values of (x 0 , x 1 ) and b as inputs. We show that the two notions are equivalent with respect to ε.
The first impossibility result for quantum OT with information theoretic security was shown by Lo [Lo97] . The main idea is that if Alice has no information about Bob's index b then Bob can learn both bits in the following way: first, Bob honestly runs the protocol with b = 0 to learn x 0 with probability 1; then he locally applies a unitary to his part of the joint final state in order to transform the joint state to the joint final state in the case of b = 1 and hence learn x 1 . Since, Bob can learn each bit with probability 1, his measurement does not change the state and hence he can perform both of them sequentially.
However, not much was known about the best possible bias that one can get for OT . In high level, OT is the "strongest" primitive, since it implies bit commitment, coin flipping, and in fact any two-party functionality. However, when one looks at the optimal constant values for the bias, then one needs to be more careful. For example, the standard way of constructing a bit commitment protocol from OT is the following: Alice and Bob perform OT with inputs x 0 , x 1 , where x 0 ⊕ x 1 is the committed bit. Since, Bob can learn only one of the two inputs, he has no information about the committed bit. On the other hand, in the reveal phase, Alice reveals both bits, and since she has no information about which one Bob has learnt, if she wants to change her mind without getting caught, she can only do it with probability 1/2 (hence her cheating probability is 3/4). Classically, one can then repeat this protocol many times in order to take this probability close to 1/2. As we can see, a perfect OT protocol does not automatically give a perfect bit commitment protocol, as there is a loss in the parameters. Hence, Kitaev's lower bound does not a priori hold for OT , since we do not know how to easily convert an OT protocol to a coin flipping protocol without any loss.
Let us also note that in the quantum setting, one can use a large number of bit commitment protocols in order to construct an OT protocol, something which is not known to be possible classically ([Yao95] , [BF10] ).
In related work, Salvail, Schaffner and Sotakova [SSS09] have quantitatively studied a different notion of security for OT protocols (and generally any two-party protocols) that they call information leakage. Information leakage is defined as the maximum amount of extra information about the other party's output given the quantum state held by one party. They prove, among other results, that any 1-out-of-2 OT protocol has a constant leakage. Their model is somewhat different, for example they do not allow the players to abort during the protocol, and their security notion is described in terms of mutual information and entropy and does not immediately translate to our security notion of guessing probabilities. However, their results provide more evidence that almost-perfect OT protocols are impossible for different variants of security.
In another work, Jain, Radhakrishnan and Sen [JRS02] showed that in a 1-out-of-n OT protocol, if Alice gets t bits of information about Bob's index b, then Bob gets at least Ω(n/2 O(t) ) bits of information about Alice's string x.
In this paper, we quantitatively study the bias of quantum oblivious transfer protocols. More precisely, we construct a coin flipping protocol that uses OT as a subroutine and show a relation between the cheating probabilities of the OT protocol and the ones of the coin flipping protocol. Then, using Kitaev's lower bound for coin flipping we derive a nontrivial lower bound (albeit weaker) on the cheating probabilities for OT . More precisely we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, we have
where f is a function that we define later. This implies for the bias ǫ of the protocol that
Moreover, in Section 4 we describe a simple 1-out-of-2 random-OT protocol and analyze the cheating probabilities of Alice and Bob. One may wonder if it would be possible to extend Kitaev's semidefinite programming formulation to include the OT primitive and get a stronger lower bound this way. In fact, in Section 5 we describe a generalisation of Kitaev's semidefinite program that captures a variant of the general k-out-of-n OT primitive. Coin flipping, is then the special case of 1-out-of-1 OT . However, there is a big difference. What the semidefinite program formulation captures is the probability that one player can force the outcome of the other one.
More precisely, we define a k-out-of-n forcing oblivious transfer protocol, denoted here as n k -fOT, with forcing bias ε as a protocol satisfying:
• Alice outputs n random bits x := (x 1 , . . . , x n )
• Bob outputs a random index set b of k indices and bit string x b consisting of x i for i ∈ b
• The forcing bias of the protocol is defined as ǫ :
where, again, the suprema are over all strategies of Alice and Bob respectively. First, notice our definition of the bias ε as a multiplicative factor instead of additive. We choose this since the honest probabilities of the two players can be very different and in this case our definition makes more sense. More importantly, this 'forcing' security definition is exactly what is needed in coin flipping, since there, Alice and Bob know each others outputs and the only cheating is forcing the other player's output in order to get a specific value for the coin. However, this is very different than the probability that one player can guess the outcome of the other player, which is the security guarantee we wish for in an OT protocol.
Nevertheless, it is still interesting to know how one can extend Kitaev's semidefinite programming formulation, what are the most general primitives that can be described in this framework, and what are their applications. For these k-out-of-n "forcing" primitives we provide optimal upper and lower bounds. In particular, the forcing bias satisfies ε ≥ √ 2 k .
Note that for the special case of coin flipping, or else 1 1 -fOT, our bounds are tight (a multiplicative bias of √ 2 is equivalent to a cheating probability of
).
Similar to coin flipping, one can get optimal protocols as well for n k -fOT.
Theorem 4 Let γ > 0. There exists a protocol for n k -fOT with cheating probabilities:
Preliminaries 2.1 Definitions of Primitives
We assume the reader is familiar with the basic notions of quantum computing. All used notions can be found in [NC00] . In the literature, many different variants of oblivious transfer have been considered. In this paper, we consider two variants of quantum oblivious transfer and for completeness we show that they are equivalent with respect to the bias ǫ.
Definition 1 (Random Oblivious Transfer) A 1-out-of-2 quantum random oblivious transfer protocol with bias ǫ, denoted here as random-OT , is a protocol between Alice and Bob such that:
• Alice outputs two bits (x 0 , x 1 ) or Abort and Bob outputs two bits (b, y) or Abort Note that this definition is slightly different from usual definitions because we want the exact value of the cheating probabilities and not only an upper bound. This is because we consider both lower bounds and upper bounds for OT protocols but we could have equivalent results using the standard definitions.
An important issue is that we quantify the security against a cheating Bob as the probability that he can guess (x 0 , x 1 ). One can imagine a security definition where Bob's guessing probability is not for (x 0 , x 1 ), but for example for x 0 ⊕ x 1 or any other function f (x 0 , x 1 ). Since we are mostly interested in lower bounds, we believe our definition is the most appropriate one, since a lower bound on the probability of guessing (x 0 , x 1 ) automatically yields a lower bound on the probability of guessing any f (x 0 , x 1 ).
We now define a second notion of OT where the values (x 0 , x 1 ) and b are Alice's and Bob's inputs respectively and show the equivalence between the two notions.
Definition 2 (Oblivious Transfer) A 1-out-of-2 quantum oblivious transfer protocol with bias ǫ, denoted here as OT , is a protocol between Alice and Bob such that:
• Alice has input x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has input b ∈ {0, 1}. We also define quantum (strong) coin flipping. 
Equivalence between the different notions of Oblivious Transfer
We show the equivalence between OT and random-OT with respect to the bias ǫ.
Proposition 1 Let P an OT protocol with bias ǫ. We can construct a random-OT protocol Q with bias ǫ using P .
Proof The construction of the OT protocol Q is pretty straightforward:
1. Alice picks x 0 , x 1 ∈ R {0, 1} uniformly at random and Bob picks b ∈ R {0, 1} uniformly at random.
2. Alice and Bob perform the OT protocol P where Alice inputs x 0 , x 1 and Bob inputs b. Let y be Bob's output. Note that at this point, Alice has no information about b and Bob has no information about (x 0 , x 1 ).
3. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort in P . Otherwise, the outputs of protocol Q are (x 0 , x 1 ) for Alice and (b, y) for Bob.
The outcomes of Q are uniformly random bits since Alice and Bob choose their inputs uniformly at random. All the other requirements that make Q an OT protocol with bias ǫ are satisfied because P is an OT protocol with bias ǫ.
We now prove how to go from a random-OT to an OT protocol.
Proposition 2 Let P a random-OT protocol with bias ǫ P . We can construct an OT protocol Q with bias ǫ Q = ǫ P using P .
Proof Let P a random-OT protocol with bias ǫ P . Consider the following protocol Q:
1. Alice has inputs X 0 , X 1 and Bob has an input B.
2. Alice and Bob run protocol P and output (x 0 , x 1 ) for Alice and (b, y) for Bob.
3. Bob sends r = b ⊕ B to Alice. Let x ′ c = x c⊕r , for c ∈ {0, 1}.
4. Alice sends to Bob (s 0 , s 1 ) where
5. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort in P . Otherwise, the output of the protocol is y ′ for Bob.
We now show that our protocol is an OT protocol with inputs with bias ǫ. First, note that the values x ′ c are known by Alice and the value y ′ is known by Bob. Also, notice that
• Alice and Bob are honest:
By definition we have y = x b . Then, we have
Moreover, Alice knows r but has no information about b and hence she has no information about B = b ⊕ r. Bob knows (s 0 , s 1 ) and r but has no information about xb, hence he has no information about XB = x ′B ⊕ sB = x ′ b⊕r ⊕ sb ⊕r = xb ⊕ sb ⊕r .
• Cheating Alice:
Alice picks r and B = b ⊕ r. Hence • Cheating Bob: Bob picks a random r, sends r to Alice and then Alice picks (s 0 , s 1 ).
We have X c = x ′ c ⊕ s c = x c⊕r ⊕ s c so it is equivalent for Bob to guess (X 0 , X 1 ) and (x 0 , x 1 ). Hence We can now conclude for the biases 
Technical Claims
The expected success probability is
Claim 2 Let |X be a pure state, Q a projection, and |Y a pure state such that Q|Y = |Y . Then we have Q|X
Proof Using Cauchy-Schwarz we have
Proof Define the angle between two pure states |ψ and |φ as A(ψ, φ) := arccos | ψ|φ |. This is a metric (see [NC00] page 413). Thus we have
Taking the cosine of both sides yields the result.
Proof Wlog suppose that θ ≥ ρ. Consider the function
for fixed ρ. Taking its derivative we get
which is nonnegative for θ ∈ [ρ, π/4]. Since f (ρ) = 0, we conclude that f (θ) ≥ 0 for θ ∈ [ρ, π/4] which gives the desired result.
A Lower Bound on Any Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In this section we prove that the bias of any random-OT protocol, and hence any OT protocol, is bounded below by a constant. We start from a random-OT protocol and first show how to construct a coin flipping protocol. Then, we prove a relation between the cheating probabilities of the coin flipping protocol and those in the random-OT protocol. Last, we use Kitaev's lower bound for coin flipping to derive a lower bound for any OT protocol.
From Oblivious Transfer to Coin Flipping
Coin Flipping Protocol via random-OT 1. Alice and Bob perform the OT protocol to create (x 0 , x 1 ) and (b, x b ) respectively. If the OT protocol is aborted then so is the coin flipping protocol. 2. Alice sends c ∈ R {0, 1} to Bob. 3. Bob sends b and y = x b to Alice. 4. If x b from Bob is consistent with Alice's bits then the output of the protocol is c ⊕ b.
Otherwise Alice aborts.
By definition, A OT and B OT denote the optimal cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob in the random-OT protocol and A CF and B CF denote the optimal cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob in the coin flipping protocol. Kitaev's lower bound says that A CF B CF ≥ 1/2. We use this inequality to derive an inequality involving A OT and B OT .
Theorem 1 In any quantum oblivious transfer protocol, we have
for the function f defined as 1 f (z) = 1 6 (3 √ 3 27z 2 − 2z + 27z − 1) 1/3 + 1 6 (3 √ 3 27z 2 − 2z + 27z − 1) −1/3 + 1/3.
This implies that the bias ǫ of the protocol satisfies
In what follows we prove the above theorem. Let ¬⊥ CF A (resp. ¬⊥ CF B ) denote the event "Alice (resp. Bob) does not abort during the entire coin flipping protocol". Let ¬⊥ OT A (resp. ¬⊥ OT B ) denote the event "Alice (resp. Bob) does not abort during the random-OT subroutine". where the suprema are taken over all possible strategies for Alice.
Cheating Alice
Cheating Bob By definition, B OT is the optimal probability of Bob learning both bits in the random-OT protocol without Alice aborting. Thus,
where the suprema are taken over all strategies for Bob.
If Bob wants to force 0 in the coin flipping protocol (a similar argument works if he wants to force 1), then first, Alice must not abort in the random-OT protocol and second, Bob must send b = c as well as the correct x c such that Alice does not abort in the last round of the coin flipping protocol. This is equivalent to saying that Bob succeeds if he guesses x c and Alice does not abort in the random-OT protocol. Since c is chosen by Alice uniformly at random, we can write the probability of Bob cheating as Notice that we use "max" instead of "sup" above. This is because an optimal strategy exists for every coin flipping protocol. This is a consequence of strong duality in the semidefinite programming formalism of [Kit03] , see [ABDR04] for details.
Let us now fix Bob's optimal cheating strategy in the CF protocol. We postpone the proof of this lemma to Subsection 3.2. We now construct a cheating strategy for Bob for the OT protocol: Run the optimal cheating CF strategy and look at Bob's state after step 1 conditioned on ¬⊥ OT A . Note that this event happens with nonzero probability in the optimal coin flipping strategy since otherwise the success probability is 0. The optimal CF strategy gives measurements that allow Bob to guess x 0 with probability p and x 1 with probability q. Bob uses these measurements and the procedure of Lemma 1 to guess (x 0 , x 1 ). Let b be the probability he guesses (x 0 , x 1 ). From Lemma 1, we have that b ≥ a(2a − 1) 2 . By definition of B OT and B CF , we have:
.
This gives us
where the implication holds since B CF ≥ 1/2. We now calculate an upper bound on B CF as a function of B OT . Let g(x) = x(2x − 1) 2 . It can be easily checked that g is bijective from [0.5, 1] to [0, 1] and increasing. Let f be the inverse function of g from [0, 1] to [0, 0.5]. Since g is increasing, f is also increasing. Hence, since B OT ≥ g(B CF ) and B CF ∈ [0.5, 1], we conclude that
We can write f analytically using computer software to get the following function
Kitaev's lower bound states that A CF B CF ≥ 1/2. From this, we have
We now proceed to give the lower bound for the bias. Since f is increasing, we have
Solving the inequality we show that ε must satisfy
Proof of the Learning-In-Sequence Lemma
The Learning-in-Sequence Lemma follows from the following simple geometric result.
Lemma 2 Let |ψ be a pure state and let {C, I − C} and {D, I − D} be two projective measurements such that
Then we have DC|ψ
Proof Define the following states
Then we can write |ψ = cos(θ)|X + e iα sin(θ)|X ′ and |ψ = cos(θ ′ )|Y + e iβ sin(θ ′ )|Y ′ with α, β ∈ R. Then we have
≥ cos 2 (θ) cos 2 (θ + θ ′ ) using Claim 3.
We now prove Lemma 1.
Proof Let |Ω AB be the joint pure state shared by Alice and Bob, where A is the space controlled by Alice and B the space controlled by Bob. Let M = {M x 0 ,x 1 } x 0 ,x 1 ∈{0,1} be Alice's projective measurement on A to determine her outputs x 0 , x 1 . Let P = {P 0 , P 1 } be Bob's projective measurement that allows him to guess x 0 with probability p = cos 2 (θ) and Q = {Q 0 , Q 1 } be Bob's projective measurement that allows him to guess x 1 with probability q = cos 2 (θ ′ ). These measurements are on B only. Recall that a =
. We consider the following projections on AB:
C (resp. D) is the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses correctly the first bit (resp. the second bit) after applying P (resp. Q).
A strategy for Bob to learn both bits is simple: apply the two measurements P and Q one after the other, where the first one is chosen uniformly at random.
The projection on the subspace where Bob guesses (x 0 , x 1 ) when applying P then Q is
Similarly, the projection on the subspace where Bob guesses (x 0 , x 1 ) when applying Q then P is
With this strategy Bob can guess both bits with probability 1 2 ||E|Ω ||
Note that we can use Lemma 2 since Bob's optimal measurement to guess x 0 and x 1 succeeds for each bit with probability at least 1/2.
A Two-Message Protocol With Bias 1/4
We present in this section a random-OT protocol with bias 1/4. This also implies, as we have shown, an OT protocol with inputs with the same bias.
Random Oblivious Transfer Protocol 1. Bob chooses b ∈ R {0, 1} and creates the state |φ b :=
|22 . 2. Alice chooses x 0 , x 1 ∈ R {0, 1} and applies the unitary |a → (−1) xa |a , where x 2 := 0. 3. Alice returns the qutrit to Bob who now has the state |ψ b :=
It is clear that Bob can learn x 0 or x 1 perfectly. Moreover, note that if he sends half of the state
|11 then he can also learn x 0 ⊕ x 1 perfectly (although in this case he does not learn either of x 0 or x 1 ). We now show that it is impossible for him to perfectly learn both x 0 and x 1 and also that his bit is not completely revealed to a cheating Alice.
Theorem 2 In the protocol described above, we have A OT = B OT = Proof We analyze the cheating probabilities of each party.
Cheating Alice
Define Bob's space as B and let σ b := Tr B (|φ b φ b |) denote the two reduced states Alice may receive in the first message. Then, the optimal strategy for Alice to learn b is to perform the optimal measurement to distinguish between σ 0 and σ 1 . In this case, she succeeds with probability 1 2 + 1 4
(see for example [KN04] ). Alice's optimal measurement is, in fact, a measurement in the computational basis. If she gets outcome |0 or |1 then she knows b with certainty. If she gets outcome |2 then she guesses. Notice also, that even after this measurement she can return the measured qutrit to Bob and the outcome of Bob's measurement will always be either Π 0 or Π 1 . Hence, Bob will never abort.
Cheating Bob
Bob wants to learn both bits (x 0 , x 1 ). We now describe a general strategy for Bob:
• Bob creates |ψ = i α i |i A |e i B and sends the A part to Alice. The |e i 's are not necessarily orthogonal but i |α i | 2 = 1.
• Alice applies U x 0 ,x 1 on her part and sends it back to Bob. He now has the state |ψ x 0 ,x 1 = i α i (−1) x i |i |e i recalling that x 2 := 0.
At the end of the protocol, Bob applies a two-outcome measurement on |ψ x 0 ,x 1 to get his guess for (x 0 , x 1 ). From this strategy, we create another strategy with the same cheating probability where Bob sends a pure state. We define this strategy as follows:
• Bob creates |ψ ′ = i α i |i A and sends the whole state to Alice.
• Alice applies U x 0 ,x 1 on her part and sends it back to Bob. He now has the state |ψ ′ x 0 ,x 1 = i α i (−1) x i |i recalling that x 2 := 0.
• Bob applies the unitary U : |i |0 → |i |e i to |ψ ′ x 0 ,x 1 |0 and obtains |ψ x 0 ,x 1 .
To determine (x 0 , x 1 ), Bob applies the same measurement as in the original strategy. Clearly both strategies have the same success probability. When Bob uses the second strategy, Alice and Bob are unentangled after the first message and Alice sends back a qutrit to Bob. Using Claim 1, we have Pr[Bob correctly guesses (x 0 , x 1 )] ≤ 3/4.
Note that there is a strategy for Bob to achieve 3/4. Bob wants to learn both bits (x 0 , x 1 ). Suppose he creates the state
and sends it to Alice. The state he receives is
Then, Bob performs a projective measurement in the 4-dimensional basis {|Ψ x 0 ,x 1 : x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1}} where
The probability that Bob guesses the two bits x 0 , x 1 correctly is
Note that in our protocol Alice never aborts.
Oblivious Transfer as a Forcing Primitive
Here, we discuss a variant of oblivious transfer, as a generalisation of coin flipping, that can be analyzed using an extention of Kitaev's semidefinite programming formalism. The main difference in this new primitive is the definition of security. Here, we design protocols to protect against a dishonest party being able to force a desired value as the output of the other player. In the previous section (and in the literature) oblivious transfer protocols are designed to protect against the dishonest party learning the other party's output. Notice, for example, that in coin flipping we can design protocols to protect against a dishonest party forcing a desired outcome, but both players learn the coin outcome perfectly. The primitive we have defined is indeed a generalization of coin flipping since we can cast the problem of coin flipping as a 1-out-of-1 forcing oblivious transfer protocol. Of course, in 1 1 -fOT Alice always knows Bob's index set so the forcing bias is the only interesting notion of security in this case.
As we said, we define the bias ε as a multiplicative factor instead of additive, since the honest probabilities can be much different and in this case our definition makes more sense. To relate this bias to the one previously studied in coin flipping we have that coin flipping protocols with bias ε ≤ √ 2 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [CK09] , and weak coin flipping protocols with bias ε ≤ 1 + δ exist for any δ > 0, see [Moc07] .
Extending Kitaev's Lower Bound to Forcing Oblivious Transfer
We now extend Kitaev's formalism from the setting of coin flipping to the more general setting of We now show the criteria for which the parameters above yield a proper n k -fOT protocol. In a proper protocol we require that Alice and Bob's measurements are consistent and that the outcomes are uniformly random when the protocol is followed honestly. Define
to be the state at the end of an honest run of the protocol. Then, we require the unitary and measurement operators to satisfy the following condition:
Similar to coin flipping, we can capture cheating strategies as semidefinite programs. Bob can force Alice to output a specific x ∈ Z n 2 with maximum probability equal to the optimal value of the following semidefinite program They are also sufficient since Bob can maintain a purification during the protocol consistent with the states above to achieve a cheating probability given by the corresponding objective value.
To capture Alice's cheating strategies we can do the same as for the cheating Bob and examine the states under Bob's control during the course of the protocol. That is, Alice can force Bob to output a specific k-element subset b and x b ∈ Z k 2 with maximum probability equal to the optimal value of the following semidefinite program The proofs that these capture the optimal cheating probabilities are the same as those used for coin flipping in [Kit03] and [ABDR04] . Using these semidefinite programs we can prove the following Theorem. In particular, the forcing bias satisfies ε ≥ √ 2 k .
Once we extended the semidefinite programming formulation, the proof of the theorem follows almost directly from the proof in [Kit03] and [ABDR04] for coin flipping except that the honest outcome probabilities are different in our case. Namely, for |ψ defined above, we have 
A Protocol with Optimal Forcing Bias
In this section we prove Theorem 4. First, consider the following protocol which achieves the bound in Theorem 3 but is asymmetric. Alice sends n random bits to Bob. Bob, then, outputs b, a random k-index subset of n indices, and x b . In this protocol Bob can force a desired outcome with probability 1 2 n and Alice can force a desired outcome with probability
. Thus the product of the cheating probabilities is optimal, that is it achieves the lower bound in Theorem 3. However the protocol is asymmetric. This can be easily remedied using coin flipping. We present an optimal protocol with this security definition.
1 -fOT protocol where each party has honest outcome probabilities of 1/4 and neither party can cheat with probability higher than
(1 + γ), for any γ > 0.
Note that we have strong coin flipping protocols with poly(m) rounds that achieve δ = 1 poly(m) . Hence, our protocol also achieves γ = 1 poly(m) with poly(m) rounds. Last, we remark that this protocol is completely classical with the exception of the quantum coin flipping subroutines. This is similar to the optimal coin flipping protocol in [CK09] designed using classical messages and optimal quantum weak coin flipping subroutines.
